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Abstract: Agency Logic assumes that executives are greedy and opportunistic, which implies 
that monetary incentives are necessary to ensure they act in the best interests of shareholders; 
whereas Corporate Logic assumes that executives are trustworthy professionals, which 
implies that they will act in the best interests of shareholders irrespective of the use of 
monetary incentives.  Prior qualitative research on executive remuneration is reviewed in this 
paper in order to ascertain how these Logics influence the decision-making of remuneration 
committees.  Given that Agency Logic and Corporate Logic are opposites, there is a tension 
between the remuneration principles of pay-for-performance and competitive pay.  However, 
Corporate Logic trumps Agency Logic as remuneration committees prioritise competitive pay 
ahead of other principles, so that talented executives will be retained.  The paper also 
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discusses a range of other remuneration principles and practices as well as the remuneration 
processes that have diffused both Logics amongst remuneration committees.  
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance; Executive Compensation; Compensation Committees; 
Institutional Theory; Institutional Logics Perspective. 
 
Introduction 
This paper presents an inventory of remuneration principles, which are inductively derived 
from prior qualitative research on executive remuneration.  Remuneration principles are 
systems of belief and reasoning which individuals and organisations use to make, interpret 
and justify remuneration decisions.  These often take the form of idioms such as pay-for-
performance and pay competitively (Bender, 2004).  Drawing on an institutional logics 
perspective – which is a branch of institutional theory – this paper asserts that beliefs, 
concepts, theories, values, etc. can become powerful forces that shape society (Thornton, 
Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2012; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  From an institutional logics 
perspective (Thornton et al., 2012), remuneration principles constrain and enable 
organisational decision-making and reporting by defining what are and are not legitimate 
actions.  Boards of directors and remuneration committees use remuneration principles to 
frame their decision-making in order to fulfil their conformance and performance roles.  
Further, remuneration principles legitimise remuneration practices (e.g. stock option plans) 
and are diffused through common remuneration processes (e.g. remuneration consultants).  
However, as remuneration principles are open to interpretation, it is possible for companies to 
justify the same remuneration practices with different remuneration principles and to justify 
different practices with the same principles. 
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By reinterpreting prior qualitative research on executive remuneration, this paper makes two 
significant contributions to knowledge.  First, the concept of the remuneration principle is 
introduced and critiqued.  Remuneration principles are a common feature in the regulation 
and practice of corporate governance, but have not featured in academic literature to date.  
Underpinning each corporate governance code of best practice is a set of principles that frame 
recommendations (e.g. ASX Corporate Governance Council, Australia, 2014; Business 
Roundtable, USA, 2012; Financial Reporting Council, UK, 2014).  Similarly, remuneration 
practices are often justified using what this paper defines as remuneration principles (Point 
and Tyson, 2006; Wade, Porac, Pollack, 1997; Zajac and Westphal, 1995).  Instead of 
studying corporate governance codes and corporate annual reports (e.g. Point and Tyson, 
2006), this paper reinterprets the beliefs and opinions of executives, directors, remuneration 
consultants, and others as presented in prior qualitative research (45 studies are reviewed, see 
Appendix A).  In doing so, this paper identifies 14 remuneration principles and then shows 
how these principles influence remuneration decision-making and how these principles have 
been diffused and institutionalised. 
 
Second, Zajac and Westphal’s (2004) theorisation of Agency Logic and Corporate Logic is 
extended by demonstrating the link between these Logics and various remuneration principles 
and practices.  Corporate Logic assumes that executives are trustworthy professionals and 
non-executive directors act as advisors, and both parties willing act in the best interests of 
shareholders; whereas, Agency Logic assumes that executives are self-interested agents and 
non-executive directors act as a constraint on the opportunistic behaviour of executives, using 
monitoring and incentive mechanisms to ensure that executives act in the best interests of 
shareholders (Lok, 2010; Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  Corporate Logic is linked to 
managerialist theory (Chandler, 1962), resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
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1978) and stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997); whereas Agency 
Logic is linked to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and managerial 
hegemony/power theory (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Mace, 1971).  However, these Logics are 
under-theorised with respect to executive remuneration.  Zajac and Westphal (2004, p.436) 
only put forward that Corporate Logic implies boards (or remuneration committees) should 
“[u]se salary and other rewards to attract and retain scarce management talent”; whereas, 
Agency Logic implies boards should “[u]se incentives to align management and shareholder 
interests”.  Prior studies have not examined these Logics’ implications for executive 
remuneration.  This paper asserts that there are two sets of remuneration principles and 
practices with one constituting Agency Logic and the other constituting Corporate Logic.    
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  Traditional research on executive 
remuneration is briefly reviewed and critiqued in the second section.  The main criticism is 
that boardroom decision-making is treated as a “black box”.  The third section discusses an 
institutional logics perspective on corporate governance, which provides a theoretical 
framework for unpacking the “black box”.  Agency Logic and Corporate Logic represent 
opposing beliefs about how corporate governance is and should be practiced.  The fourth 
section presents an inventory of remuneration principles.  Drawing on an institutional logics 
perspective, how remuneration committees use the remuneration principles to make decisions 
is discussed.  The fifth section examines the typical remuneration package for executives and 
how it is justified.  This package can be justified using Agency Logic and/or Corporate Logic.  
A framework for the diffusion and institutionalisation of the remuneration principles and 
Logics is presented in the penultimate section.  Throughout these sections future research 
opportunities are highlighted.  In the final section, theoretical and practical implications of the 
remuneration principles and Logics are elucidated.  
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Traditional Research on Executive Remuneration 
There has been a plethora of research on executive remuneration (Murphy, 2013).  Agency 
theory – a mathematised version of Agency Logic (Zajac and Westphal, 2004) – has 
underpinned most of this research, where it has been argued that executive remuneration 
should be tied to firm performance, particularly shareholder returns (Dalton, Hitt, Certo and 
Dalton, 2007; Gerhart, Rynes and Fulmer, 2009).  This will ensure, in an ideal world, that 
resources are managed effectively and efficiently at both the organisational and societal levels 
(Kaen, Kaufman and Zacharias, 1988).  Meta-analyses have found mixed results with the 
general consensus being that there is a significant but weak relationship between CEO pay 
and firm performance (Dalton, Daily, Certo and Roengpitya, 2003; van Essen, Heugens, 
Otten and van Oosterhout, 2012; van Essen, Otten and Carberry, 2015; Rost and Osterloh, 
2009; Tosi, Werner, Katz and Gomez-Mejia, 2000).  Gerhart and Fang (2014, p.50) conclude 
that, “…it is difficult to envision how individuals, companies, and economies would fare 
better, on average, by significantly diminishing the role of PFIP [pay for individual 
performance] in organizations.”  Despite the empirical evidence being less than fully 
supportive of Agency Theory and the efficacy of incentive schemes, Gerhart and Fang’s 
sentiment has been commonplace in the accounting, economics, finance, and management 
literature on executive remuneration for at least forty years.   
 
There are at least two significant problems with traditional research on executive 
remuneration.  Firstly, many scholars appear to blindly follow agency theory with only 
superficial consideration given to alternative theories.  This is best observed in the many 
reformulations of agency theory as scholars have attempted to build complexity and 
exceptions into agency theory in order to defend it against criticism and incorporate empirical 
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evidence that is suggestive of alternative explanations (e.g. see Lan and Heracleous, 2010; 
Lubatkin, Lane, Collin and Very, 2007; Pepper and Gore, 2015; Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodriguez 
and Gomez-Mejia, 2012).  Alternatives such as expectancy theory, institutional theory, labour 
market theory, social comparison theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, etc. are 
under-researched relative to agency theory (for reviews, see Gomez-Mejia, Berrone and 
Franco-Santos, 2010, Chapter 4; Otten, 2007).  Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton (2005, p.8) argued 
that, “theories can “win” in the marketplace for ideas, independent of their empirical 
validity…”  Ghoshal (2005) argued that this has occurred in the case of agency theory and 
that agency theory had become a self-fulfilling prophecy as business schools disseminated its 
assumptions and prescriptions among business leaders.  Further, Pirson and Lawrence (2010) 
called for a paradigm shift in business research from economism (exemplified by agency 
theory) towards humanism.  Despite criticism, agency theory remains firmly entrenched in 
academic and business discourse (Dobbin and Jung, 2010).  
 
Secondly, most scholars investigating the effects of how and how much executives are paid 
on firm performance have overlooked the pay-setting process (i.e. the work of the 
remuneration committee and remuneration consultants), treating it as a black box.  The 
emphasis has been on finding universal truths.  This is exemplified by Jensen and Murphy’s 
(1990, p.225) often cited study, which found that “CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every 
$1,000 change in shareholder wealth.”  Traditionally, scholars have used proxies – variables 
that are easy to measure – to study behaviour and processes.  For example, Cremers and 
Grinstein (2014) study the extent to which CEOs are paid for luck and/or skill by comparing 
firm returns to industry returns, rather than assessing the actions of CEOs and the 
circumstances which they faced.  Similarly, Haynes, Campbell and Hitt (2014) measured 
CEO greed using financial outcomes, rather than assessing the psychological profile of CEOs.  
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Treating the pay-setting process as a black box severely limits what can be learnt about 
organisational behaviour.  However, there is a small but growing body of research that is 
studying the black box (e.g. Adams and Gianneti, 2012; Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2013).  
Such research uses surveys to understand the psychology and behaviour of CEOs, directors 
and others, and then relates this to their pay and performance.  
 
An Institutional Logics Perspective on Corporate Governance 
Drawing on institutional theory, an institutional logics perspective asserts that beliefs, norms, 
rules, values, etc. enable and constrain people’s behaviour and when an institutional logic 
dominates part of society, people’s behaviour becomes homogenous (Thornton et al., 2012).  
From this perspective, there is reason to think that Agency Logic – which encompasses 
agency theory – has had a homogenising effect on organisations, particularly executive 
remuneration policies and practices.  For instance, in a study of Harvard Business Review 
articles, Spector and Spital (2011) found that agency theory is built on an ideology, not 
empirical evidence that favours managerial incentives.  Advancing this ideology was “Arch 
Patton, a McKinsey Consultant and the most published author in the Harvard Business 
Review during the 1950s” (p.315).  There was much financial gain for consultants and 
business leaders as incentive schemes became widely adopted. They concluded that, “Agency 
theory, which is presented as a rational and legitimate argument in favor of such [executive] 
bonuses, fails to address the historical context in which bonuses actually took root in 
corporate America” (p.315).  If Agency Logic is indeed an ideology or beliefs system that 
permeates academic and business discourse, then it may be that remuneration committees 
draw on Agency Logic to both guide and justify their decision-making.  However, there may 
also be other Logics that influence their decision-making. 
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Corporate Logic, Agency Logic and Stakeholder Logic are the most commonly studied 
institutional logics of corporate governance, although these have not always been consistently 
named.  Corporate Logic is also known as Managerial Capitalism (Green, Babb and Alpaslan, 
2008) or Management Control Logic (Shipilov, Greve and Rowley, 2010).  Agency Logic 
(Zajac and Westphal, 2004) is also known as Investor Capitalism (Green et al., 2008), Board 
Reform Logic (Shipilov et al., 2010), and Logic of Shareholder Value Maximisation (Lok, 
2010). Stakeholder Logic – which is linked to stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995) – is also known as Value Logic (du Plessis, 2008).  Note that Stakeholder Logic is 
comparable to Corporate Logic, except that the corporate objective is stakeholder value 
maximisation, not shareholder value maximisation (du Plessis, 2008).  These three Logics are 
related to various organisational theories as aforementioned, but differ from theories in that 
these Logics represented shared beliefs that are not necessarily internally consistent, well-
defined or unchanging.  For instance, Agency Logic encompasses the notion of executives 
following narrow and enlightened self-interest (Lok, 2010; also see Rocha and Ghoshal, 
2006), which is analogous of a short- versus long-term outlook on firm performance. 
 
An institutional logics perspective can be viewed as a branch of institutional theory of which 
there are many (for reviews, see Schmidt, 2010; Scott, 2008).  It could also be viewed as “a 
metatheoretical framework for analysing the interrelationships among institutions, 
individuals, and organizations in social systems” (Thornton et al., 2012, p.2).  With respect to 
this paper, it relates to how sets of ideas with durable meanings – Logics and principles – 
constrain and enable the remuneration committee’s decision-making.  This focus is an echo of 
John Maynard Keynes’ concern that economic theories influence practice: he famously wrote, 
“Madmen [sic] in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some 
academic scribbler of a few years back” (Keynes, 1936, p.383).  Institutional theory and an 
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institutional logic perspective provide a lens through which the influence of theory on practice 
can be studied.  In particular, whether the remuneration committee believes it should use 
remuneration schemes to foster loyalty and goodwill from executives (Corporate and 
Stakeholder Logic) or to control the assumed opportunistic behaviour of executives (Agency 
Logic), in order to maximise shareholder value (Agency and Corporate Logic) or maximise 
stakeholder value (Stakeholder Logic). 
 
Prior research has found that there are multiple, competing institutional logics of corporate 
governance that influence organisational decision-making, particularly between Corporate 
Logic and Agency Logic (e.g. Green et al., 2008).  Heugens and Otten (2007) found that 
multiple Logics are embedded in the recommendations of corporate governance codes from 
around the globe, although there were differences between countries.  In the USA, studies 
have documented a shift from Corporate Logic to Agency Logic (Jung, 2014; Rhee and Fiss, 
2014; Zajac and Westphal, 2004), although this transition has been contested (Fiss, Kennedy 
and Davis, 2012; Green et al., 2008) and has given rise to practices that symbolically conform 
to Agency Logic (Joseph, Ocasio and McDonnell, 2014; Westphal and Graebner, 2010; Zajac 
and Westphal, 2004).  More recently, there are signs that there has been a shift towards 
Corporate Logic (Westphal and Park, 2012) and Stakeholder Logic (Ioannou and Serafeim, 
2015).   Other countries have also experienced a shift towards Agency Logic including 
Canada (Shipilov et al., 2010), Germany (Chizema, 2008, 2010; Chizema and Buck, 2006; 
Fiss and Zajac, 2004, 2006; Sanders and Tushke, 2007), Japan (Desender, Aguilera, 
Lopezpuertas-Lamy and Cerspi, 2016; Morris, Hassard and McCann, 2008), Netherlands 
(Bezemer, Zajac, Naumovska, van den Bosch and Volberda, 2015) and the UK (Ezzamel, 
Willmott and Worthington, 2008; Lok, 2010), although these countries are still experiencing 
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an institutional battle between Logics with evidence of symbolic practices (e.g. Fiss and 
Zajac, 2004, 2006).      
 
There are two significant problems with these studies.  Firstly, the majority of the 
aforementioned studies have treated boardroom decision-making as a black box with an 
emphasis on the diffusion of practices over time and the antecedents and effects of diffusion 
(e.g. Westphal and colleagues).  A few studies (Ezzamel et al., 2008; Green et al., 2008; Lok, 
2010) have examined how these Logics have shaped decision-making.  Interestingly, Lok 
(2010) found that there may be a merging of Corporate Logic and Agency Logic.  Secondly, 
none of these studies have investigated how remuneration committees make and report 
decisions.  Instead, the focal point has been on symbolic practices.  For example, US investors 
react positively to the adoption of long-term incentive plans, particularly if justified by the 
language of agency theory, irrespective of whether the plans are subsequently implemented 
(Westphal and Zajac, 1998, 2013; Zajac and Westphal, 1995).  Overall, scholars have used an 
institutional logics perspective to examine socio-economic, not socio-psychological 
phenomena.  Thus, this paper’s point of difference is to bring an institutional logics 
perspective to bear on qualitative research on executive remuneration in order to unpack the 
black box that is the remuneration committee and its decision-making.   
 
Remuneration Principles 
Remuneration principles are abstract, affirmative statements that frame how remuneration 
decisions should be made.  Distinct from rules, principles do not prohibit any remuneration 
practices and processes; principles are loose, not tight constraints because of they are open to 
interpretation.  Drawing on the notion of induction, 14 remuneration principles have been 
derived from 45 qualitative studies on executive remuneration (for a summary, see Appendix 
Executive Remuneration Principles, Practices and Processes 
Page 11 
A).  Table 1 provides definitions and critique of the 14 remuneration principles, labelled: 
market, human resources, fairness, pay-for-performance, strategic pay, balanced 
measurement, out-performance, alignment, motivation, ability-to-pay, conformance, 
independence, consultant and transparency.  This is an extensive, but not an exhaustive list; 
future research and debate among academics, practitioners, investors, regulators, etc. will be 
required to determine if any remuneration principles are missing or could be omitted and if 
the definitions are adequate.  As highlighted in Table 1, the definitions are open to 
interpretation.  For example, the pay-for-performance principle does not specify the 
optimality (or desired strength) of the relationship.  Operationalising the remuneration 
principles will require remuneration committees to make many decisions that may vary across 
organisations, industries, countries, time periods, etc. (Malsch, Tremblay and Gendron, 2012; 
Pepper and Gore, 2014); these differences are not explored in this paper.   
 
----- Insert Table 1 here ----- 
 
Table 2 shows the strength of agreement with the remuneration principles amongst the 
directors, executives, consultants, investors, etc. whose opinions have been presented in the 
45 qualitative studies reviewed (for a detailed breakdown, see Appendix A).  The subjects of 
those studies expressed views that were consistent with many of the principles, although some 
had views that were contrary.  The principles with support in 10 or more studies are (from 
most to least support): pay-for-performance, market, consultant, motivation, conformance, 
human resources, strategic pay, and independence.  Collectively, this means that executives 
will be motivated to exert the desired effort if their remuneration is contingent on (1) firm 
performance, (2) firm strategy, (3) remuneration of their peers and (4) their expectations, 
while independent directors, advised by remuneration consultants, decide how to make and 
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report these decisions (e.g. Bender, 2004, Figure 1, p.531).  On the other hand, principles that 
are disputed in four or more studies included (from most to least disagreement): motivation, 
consultant, market, conformance, transparency, and pay-for-performance.  Some subjects 
(including executives) expressed doubt about the motivational effects of short- and long-term 
incentive schemes (e.g. Pennings, 1993; Bender, 2004; Pepper, Gore and Crossman, 2013), 
and the general belief of directors that their executives are above-average performers, 
deserving of above-average pay (e.g. Bender and Moir, 2006; Hermanson, Tompkins, 
Veliyath and Yer, 2012; Perkins and Hendry, 2005).   
 
----- Insert Table 2 here ----- 
 
Given the strength of agreement and disagreement with the remuneration principles, it is most 
likely that both Agency Logic and Corporate Logic, but not Stakeholder Logic, are embedded 
in the business discourse on executive remuneration.  While there is support for the 
conformance principle – which makes reference to the interests of stakeholders, rather than 
only shareholders – non-shareholding stakeholders such as customers, employees, suppliers, 
etc. are rarely mentioned in the 45 studies (cf. Bender and Moir, 2006).  Support for the 
conformance principle relates to the desire of remuneration committees to avoid media and 
public scrutiny (Bender, 2011b; Hermanson et al., 2012; Malsch et al., 2012).  The general 
consensus of the subjects in the 45 studies is that publicly listed companies exist to enhance 
shareholder value, but they disagreed on whether or not monetary incentives are necessary to 
ensure that executives will act in the best interests of shareholders (e.g. Pennings, 1993; 
Pepper et al., 2013; St-Onge, Magnan, Thorne and Raymond, 2001).  Agency Logic’s 
assumption that executives are opportunistic and extrinsically-motivated is reflected in the 
pay-for-performance, alignment and motivation principles, and its prescription for non-
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executive directors to monitor executives is reflected in the independence principle.  In 
contrast, Corporate Logic’s assumption that executives are intrinsically-motivated and desire 
to be paid equitably given their professional work ethic is reflected in the market, human 
resources and fairness principles as well as in the disagreement with the pay-for-performance, 
alignment and motivation principles.   
 
Consistent with other studies, Hermanson et al. (2012, p.667) found, “Many of the 
interviewees appeared to describe a pervasive tension between resource dependence theory 
(paying enough to be reasonable in the market and retain executives through fair 
compensation) and agency theory (pay for performance, proper alignment of incentives, and 
shareholder-friendly compensation).”  This tension underscores that Agency Logic and 
Corporate Logic are competing, not co-existing in business discourse.  The distribution of 
belief in Agency Logic and/or Corporate Logic amongst directors, executives, consultants, 
investors, etc. is unknown at present, but is unlikely to be one-sided.  Remuneration 
committees and powerful stakeholders (e.g. investors) may favour Agency Logic, Corporate 
Logic, both Agency Logic and Corporate Logic, or alternative Logics.  This gives scope to 
remuneration committees to use empty rhetoric and symbolic practices to resolve tension 
inside and outside the boardroom.  For example, there has been both an increase in the 
proportion of at-risk remuneration and total remuneration for CEOs of large publicly listed 
companies in recent decades (Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos and Murphy, 2013; Frydman and 
Saks, 2010), but the increase in the proportion of at-risk remuneration may be symbolic 
conformance with Agency Logic as remuneration committees may have also increased the 
total potential remuneration, ensuring that CEOs are paid comparably to their peers – 
consistent with Corporate Logic – irrespective of firm performance.  This line of reasoning is 
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consistent with Bender’s (2007) finding that CEO pay almost always increases following 
changes to remuneration practices. 
 
While the Logics and remuneration principles provide remuneration committees with a 
framework for making and reporting decisions, how the Logics and principles affect those 
decisions is indeterminate at present.  This is because prior studies have focused on executive 
remuneration in general terms, not specific decisions that remuneration committees have 
made.  The rare exceptions are Bender’s (2007) study of why 12 remuneration committees 
made specific changes to their remuneration schemes and Ogden and Watson’s (2008) study 
of the choice of the peer group and performance measures for the long-term incentive plan in 
five companies.  In making and reporting decisions, the remuneration committee will have to 
prioritise the remuneration principles in some manner because not all principles can be 
simultaneously enacted.  Future research should examine how multiple Logics – the varying 
beliefs of directors, executives, etc. – affect the prioritisation and symbolic use of the 
principles.  Qualitative research methods and experiments can be employed to unpack how 
remuneration committees make and report specific decisions.  Further, quantitative research 
methods can be employed to survey the distribution of belief among directors, executives, 
investors, etc. in a similar vein to Pepper and Gore (2014) and to survey the incidence of 
remuneration principles in codes and corporate annual reports, extending the work of Zajac 
and Westphal (1995), Wade et al. (1997) and Point and Tyson (2006).   
 
Remuneration Practices 
Table 3 presents a range of remuneration practices, how remuneration principles influence 
those practices, and other relevant findings from prior qualitative research.  The typical 
remuneration package for executives includes base salary and benefits, pension (or 
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superannuation), other payments for recruitment, retention and severance, short-term 
incentives and long-term incentives (Chambers and Weight, 2008; Fernandes et al., 2013; 
Murphy, 1999, 2013).  The remuneration package for executives differs across industries, 
countries and time periods (Fernandes et al., 2013; Frydman and Saks, 2010; Sanchez-Marin, 
2008).  However, the 45 studies reviewed here have not extensively investigated many of the 
remuneration practices listed in Table 3.  Prior qualitative research has examined multiple 
aspects of long-term incentives in depth (e.g. Ogden and Watson, 2008), but typically only 
discuss executive remuneration in general terms (e.g. Bender, 2004; Hermanson et al., 2012; 
Pennings, 1993).  Nevertheless, Table 3 shows that the remuneration principles shape how 
remuneration decisions are made and reported.  The market, human resources, consultant and 
conformance principles affect the remuneration practices that are selected and the level of 
remuneration.  The pay-for-performance, strategic pay, alignment and motivation principles 
affect the selection of performance measures and the mix of fixed and variable pay.  Notably 
the potential value of short- and long-term incentives is often expressed as a multiple of base 
salary.  This means that the selection of the level relative to a peer group (e.g. lower quartile, 
medium or upper quartile) – an operationalization of the market and human resources 
principles – is the most critical decision on which executive remuneration rests (e.g. 
Hermanson et al., 2012; Kostiander and Ikaheimo, 2012; Ogden and Watson, 2012).  
 
----- Insert Table 3 here ----- 
 
In contrast to Corporate Logic, there is a negative connation of executives in both academic 
and media discourse; instead of being portrayed as trustworthy professionals, an image of 
greedy opportunists has emerged (e.g. the Institute of Policy Studies has published an annual 
review of “executive excess” in the USA since 1994).  This image has been strengthened by 
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traditional research, which found a weak relationship between CEO pay and firm performance 
as well as companies widely adopting symbolic remuneration practices.  However, consistent 
with Corporate Logic, directors and executives do not see themselves as greedy opportunists, 
and this is why the market and human resources principles strongly influence how and how 
much executives are paid (e.g. Main, 1993; Malsch et al., 2012; St-Onge et al., 2001).  
Another significant tenet of Corporate Logic is that the underlying belief that all executives 
are above-average performers, deserving of above-average remuneration (e.g. Hermanson et 
al., 2012; Malsch et al., 2012; Ogden and Watson, 2012); this should, in theory, be countered 
by the ability-to-pay and fairness principles, but these principles have limited support (see 
Table 2).  The implication is that Corporate Logic is weak or less than fully institutionalised.  
This may be due to boards of directors being comprised of former executives, who are 
perhaps too sympathetic towards current executives (Ogden and Watson, 2012), and/or the 
institutionalisation of Agency Logic with its emphasis on incentive schemes.  
 
Agency Logic has popular appeal, casting executives as the villain, investors as the victim and 
non-executive directors as the hero.  Through the use of a complex myriad of incentive 
schemes, the remuneration committee (comprised of non-executive directors) will bring the 
executives to justice, or at least not pay them more than their contribution to firm performance 
(e.g. Bender and Moir, 2006; Hermanson et al., 2012; Malsch et al., 2012).  This narrative is 
borne out in strong support for the pay-for-performance, strategic pay, alignment, motivation, 
independence and transparency principles (see Table 2).  The typical remuneration package 
for executives is substantively shaped by these principles.  Both short- and long-term 
incentives are dependent on multiple performance measures with relative targets.  As a 
compensation committee member contemplated, “This business [i.e., CEO compensation] is 
one of the most measured businesses on a quantitative basis around…” (Malsch, et al., 2012, 
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p.408).  However, this level of complexity is not rational because the computational 
capabilities of executives are bounded and they cannot possibly choose the course of action 
that maximises their remuneration (Main, Jackson, Pymm and Wright, 2008; Pepper et al., 
2013).  Thus, the institutionalisation of Agency Logic has resulted in a kind of madness, 
where increasingly complex incentive schemes are touted as the cure to corporate failures and 
perceived executive greed (Murphy, 2013; Murphy and Jensen, 2011), despite the reality that 
executives heavily discount the value of complex and long-term incentive schemes (Pepper et 
al., 2013; Pepper and Gore, 2014).  
 
Together, Agency Logic and Corporate Logic provide remuneration committees with a set of 
beliefs and notions that are contradictory and somewhat irrational from both organisational 
and societal perspectives.  As shown in Table 3, all of the remuneration practices can be 
justified with multiple remuneration principles, despite Agency Logic and Corporate Logic 
having opposing assumptions and prescriptions.  For example, St-Onge et al. (2001) found 
stock option plans can be used to attract and retain executives (human resources principle), 
ensure executives are paid competitively (market principle), motivate executives to exert 
effort (motivation principle) and align executives’ interests with those of shareholders 
(alignment principle).  There are, of course, tensions between these principles, and these have 
been noted by many scholars (e.g. Bender and Moir, 2006; Hermanson et al., 2012; Main et 
al., 2008, 2011).  For example, Main et al. (2008, p.235) concluded, “…efforts by 
remuneration committees to conform may lead them away from implementing remuneration 
arrangements that are in the best interest of long term shareholder value”, which casts doubt 
on the compatibility of the conformance and alignment principles.  However, as both Agency 
Logic and Corporate Logic appear to be legitimate discourses among powerful stakeholders 
such as investors, media, regulators, etc. (e.g. Lok, 2010; Westphal and Park, 2012), the 
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incompatibility of these Logics affords remuneration committees much discretion in 
designing remuneration packages for executives. 
 
Further research is required to fully explore how the remuneration principles both individually 
and as a set affect the design of remuneration packages for executives in the vein of Bender 
(2007), Ogden and Watson (2008) and St-Onge et al. (2001).  Scholars can use qualitative 
research methods to explore how and why remuneration committees choose specific 
remuneration practices.  It may be that the institutionalisation of both Agency Logic and 
Corporate Logic has crowded out alternative remuneration principles and practices, thereby 
constraining remuneration committees.  Drawing on the notion of institutional identity (Lok, 
2010), non-executive directors may feel that members of remuneration committees are 
supposed to speak the language of and adopt the practices of Agency Logic and Corporate 
Logic, irrespective of whether they believe in the efficacy of the associated remuneration 
principles and practices.  Also, scholars can use quantitative research methods (e.g. cluster 
analysis) to determine the extent to which the remuneration practices of firms are consistent 
each of the Logics.  The findings from qualitative research can be drawn on to aid scholars as 
they formulate and test hypotheses, so that they are able to continue to unpack the decision 
making of remuneration committees (e.g. Pepper et al., 2013 employed qualitative and 
quantitative methods).   
 
Experiments are another avenue for future research.  There is only one experimental study in 
this paper’s sample of qualitative research: Wilkins, Hermanson and Cohen (2015).  In that 
study, the authors examined the conditions under which remuneration committees are likely 
to decrease a CEO’s bonus target partway through the performance period.  There are a 
myriad of remuneration decisions that the remuneration committee faces and these could be 
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studied using a similar approach.  Particular attention could be given to how directors’ beliefs 
– represented by the Logics and principles – influence their decision-making.  Some 
interesting experimental manipulations may be related to the CEO’s behaviour (self-interested 
versus altruistic), the quantum of CEO pay and societal expectations (one Logic being 
dominant or multiple, competing Logics).  With respect to the latter, it may be that the 
remuneration committee perceives greater latitude in decision-making when there are multiple 
Logics rather than when one Logic is dominant.  Also, the remuneration committee may use 
symbolic remuneration practices when there is a mismatch between its preferred Logic and 
society’s (or shareholders’) preferred Logic (Zajac and Westphal, 2004). 
 
Remuneration Processes 
Figure 1 depicts that relational, historical, competitive and institutional pressures influence 
how the remuneration committee makes and reports decisions (Crombie, 2013).  Relational 
pressures arise from the remuneration committee’s interaction with the board of directors, 
CEO (and other executives), directors within their network, professionals (e.g. auditors and 
lawyers) and consultants, regulators, media, financial analysts, investors, bankers, etc. (see 
discursive institutionalism, Schmidt, 2010).  Historical pressures arise from the collective, 
past experiences of the members of the remuneration committee.  Those experiences can be 
educational, personal or professional.  Historical pressures are particularly influential because 
people tend to make decisions that are consistent with past decisions, in order to reduce 
uncertainty (see historical institutionalism, Schmidt, 2010).  Competitive pressure arises from 
the markets in which an organisation participates such as those for labour, capital and 
products/services (see rational choice institutionalism, Schmidt, 2010).  Institutional pressures 
– coercive/regulative, normative and mimetic – arise from the shared beliefs, norms and 
values that permeate a sector of society (or an organisational field) (see sociological 
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institutionalism, Schmidt, 2010).  It is through these pressures that Logics will be diffused and 
institutionalised, depending upon the strength and homogeneity of the pressures, diversity of 
beliefs among influential parties, degree of institutional entrepreneurship and resilience of 
existing institutions to external jolts (Scott, 2008; Thornton et al., 2012).   
 
----- Insert Figure 1 here ----- 
 
Corporate Logic implies that the remuneration committee should have a strategic role, which 
necessitates a close working relationship with the CEO; whereas Agency Logic implies that 
they should have an evaluator/judging role, meaning they should operate independently of the 
CEO.  Consistent with Corporate Logic, prior qualitative research has found that there is a 
complex relationship between the remuneration committee and CEO, where the CEO 
certainly does influence the remuneration committee, but this influence is not undue (Bender 
2004, 2011b; Hermanson et al., 2012; Main, 1993; Main et al., 2008, 2011; Perkins and 
Hendry, 2005; Ogden and Watson, 2004, 2012).  The primary concern of remuneration 
committees is attracting and retaining talented executives, not policing opportunistic 
executives (Conyon et al., 2000; Hermanson et al., 2012; Malsch et al., 2012; Ogden and 
Watson, 2012).  This does not mean that remuneration committees are not wary of being 
unduly influenced and they do indeed assert that much effort goes into negotiating the CEO’s 
contract and any changes to it, evaluating the CEO’s performance and ratifying the CEO’s 
remuneration decisions regarding his/her direct reports (Hermanson et al., 2012; Main et al., 
2008, 2011; Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  However, remuneration committees are susceptible 
to groupthink and adopting remuneration practices that are common amongst their peers (i.e. 
historical and mimetic pressures).  
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Remuneration committees are also compelled to adhere to best practice (i.e. coercive and 
normative pressures), reflected in their strong support for the consultant and conformance 
principles (see Table 2).  The reliance on remuneration consultants for data and advice is a 
common theme in the studies reviewed, although their influence is downplayed by non-
executive directors (Bender 2011a; Hermanson et al., 2012; Main, 1993; Ogden and Watson, 
2012).  It has been very rare to find remuneration committees that do not employ 
remuneration consultants with one case in Main (1993) and another in Bender (2011a); 
remuneration committees see them as necessary evil (Perkins and Hendry, 2005).  
Remuneration consultants provide a foundation on which remuneration committees build their 
remuneration practices; thus, they diffuse and legitimise certain beliefs, norms, values, etc. 
(Bender, 2011a; Malsch et al., 2012).  This partially explains why the market and human 
resources principles are so strongly supported.  Similarly, code issuers (e.g. regulators, stock 
exchanges, etc.) influence remuneration committees, diffusing best practice (Bender, 2007; 
Kovacevic, 2009; Main, 1993; Main et al., 2008).  However, Ogden and Watson (2008) found 
that this coercive pressure is not necessarily strong; remuneration committees observed the 
UK code to be non-specific with respect to the design of long-term incentive plans.      
 
Shareholders and non-shareholding stakeholders exert considerable influence over 
remuneration committees in both direct and perceived terms (Bender and Moir, 2006; 
Hermanson et al., 2012; Kovacevic, 2009).  Shareholders (e.g. institutional investors), media 
and regulators exert a direct influence; the board – which includes members of the 
remuneration committee – will meet shareholders and respond to information requests from 
media and regulators (Bender and Moir, 2006; Hermanson et al., 2012; Kovacevic, 2009; 
Main et al., 2011).  However, the influence of non-shareholding stakeholders tends to be less 
direct and more perceived.  Remuneration committees are very concerned about how the 
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media and public will react to their decisions; thus, it is their perception of how non-
shareholding stakeholders will react that matters (Bender and Moir, 2006; Hermanson et al., 
2012; Malsch et al., 2012).  This is inconsistent with Stakeholder Logic as remuneration 
committees are not aiming to direct executives to act in the best interests of all stakeholders, 
but wanting to avoid negative attention.  Instead, remuneration committees work with 
executives to ensure that the remuneration policies and practices will encourage, but not 
necessarily coerce executives and employees to act in the best interests of shareholders 
(Bender and Moir, 2006; Hermanson et al., 2012; Ogden and Watson, 2006).  This is more 
consistent with Corporate Logic than Agency Logic.  
 
While there is no doubt that relational, historical, competitive and institutional pressures 
influence remuneration committees, the nature and strength of that influence is less well 
understood at present.  However, the diffusion of Agency Logic and Corporate Logic has not 
been studied at the micro- or organisational-level with respect to executive remuneration; 
thus, it is difficult to pinpoint how these Logics have become institutionalised.  The main 
deficiency in the studies reviewed is that almost all of them have investigated executive 
remuneration in a general sense, rather than focusing on specific decisions that remuneration 
committees have made.  A rare exception is Ogden and Watson (2008), whose findings 
discounted the strength of normative pressure on five case companies.  Future qualitative 
research should focus on a small sample of companies in order to investigate the relative 
strengths of the pressures described here.  For example, remuneration consultants are 
influential, but remuneration committees are somewhat dismissive of their influence (Bender, 
2011a; Perkins and Hendry, 2005); a close examination of how decisions are made should 
reveal the extent of their influence.  Further, unlike quantitative research that has focused on 
symbolic practices, qualitative research has rarely investigated the extent to which 
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remuneration committees decouple internal decisions from external reporting in order to 
mitigate the various pressures.  Finally, experiments could be carried out to understand how 
the remuneration committee is likely to make and report decisions when competitive and 
institutional pressures vary in strength.   
 
Conclusion 
The central thesis of an institutional logics perspective is that ideas matter; beliefs, norms, 
rules, values, etc. that are embedded in society’s (or a sector of society’s) collective 
consciousness have the power to shape people’s behaviour (Thornton et al., 2012).  This 
paper shows that three ideas – Agency Logic, Corporate Logic and, to a much lesser extent, 
Stakeholder Logic – are embedded in the remuneration principles, practices and processes of 
publicly listed companies.  Remuneration committees draw on a range of remuneration 
principles – in which the Logics are reflected – to design remuneration packages for 
executives and to evaluate their performance, so that executives act in the best interests of 
shareholders.  This instrumental approach is tempered; not all non-executive directors believe 
that monetary incentives motivate executives and instead, they aim to pay executives 
comparably to their peers.  These remuneration principles and practices are most likely 
diffused through professional networks (e.g. remuneration consultants).  The principles 
legitimate the decisions of remuneration committees and defend them against criticism from 
shareholders, regulators and the media.  However, given the general nature of the qualitative 
studies reviewed, the extent to which each of the Logics has become substantively or 
symbolically embedded in the remuneration decisions is not yet fully understood; there is 
much scope for future qualitative, archival and experimental research in this area as have been 
noted throughout this paper. 
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There has been much criticism of executives, particularly how much money they are paid, and 
the remuneration committees that assess their performance and award their pay. Such 
criticism is desirable in a democratic, capitalist society; corporations should be held to 
account.  The response of remuneration committees to such criticism has been to draw on a 
range of remuneration principles to defend and legitimise their decisions, and to design 
increasingly complex remuneration packages for executives.  It is difficult to argue with an 
approach that advocates competitive remuneration, linked to firm performance.   However, it 
is impossible for executives to rationally respond to the myriad of performance measures and 
incentives schemes which they are subject; undoubtedly, executives ignore some (e.g. long-
term incentives) and focus their efforts on others.  Further, the belief that remuneration 
committees only hire executives that are above-average performers, deserving of above-
average pay – resulting in an overemphasis of the market and human resources principles – is 
a logical impossibility.  Echoing Hodak’s (2005) sentiment, remuneration committees are 
advised to be more sceptical of the remuneration principles and to simplify their remuneration 
practices.  If money is not a strong motivator for some executives, perhaps they will not 
object to being paid below the median.  Shareholders, regulators, the media, etc. are also 
advised to demand simpler remuneration packages for executives, and to be wary of 
remuneration policies and practices that are illogical or lack substance. 
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Table 1: Remuneration Principles 
Remuneration Principles Openness of Remuneration Principles (or Criticisms) 
1. Market principle: An executive’s 
remuneration should be set relative to that 
of other executives, particularly those in 
comparable positions, so that there is a 
degree of horizontal equity between 
executives. 
The market principle does not (1) account for an executive’s contribution to firm performance, 
(2) specify the meaning of relative or comparable (i.e. should all executives in a peer group 
receive the same level of remuneration?); (3) specify if all elements of pay should be comparable 
(e.g. salary and/or bonuses); (4) specify how the peer group of any given executive is to be 
decided (e.g. internal or external peers, firms in similar industry, etc.); and (5) specify if 
comparisons should be direct or scaled/adjusted in some manner (e.g. job-sizing methods). 
2. Human resources principle: To attract 
and retain talented executives, their 
preferences and expectations should be 
taken into account when negotiating their 
remuneration packages and setting the 
level of remuneration. 
The human resources principle assumes that money constitutes a major part of executives’ 
preferences and expectations, but offers no further insight.  The notion that executives possess 
“special” knowledge and skills that are uncommon among the general population is reinforced 
(i.e. there is a limited supply of executives).  No guidance is given on what level of remuneration 
is necessary to attract and retain executives (e.g. upper quartile relative to a peer group).  Further, 
the negotiating position of boards is weakened as they do not want to lose talented executives. 
3. Fairness principle: An executive’s 
remuneration should be set relative to 
other employees in the organisation, so 
that there is a degree of vertical equity 
from the highest to lowest paid employee. 
The fairness principle links the remuneration of executives and employees, acting as a constraint 
on executive remuneration.  However, the ratio between the highest and lowest paid employee is 
unspecified.  How to determine this ratio is also unspecified.  Having an unchanging ratio limits 
the possible actions of executives as, for example, they may be unwilling to pursue a cost 
reduction strategy that would lower the pay of employees and, consequently, themselves.  
4. Pay-for-performance principle: An 
executive’s remuneration should be tied 
to firm performance. 
The pay-for-performance principle assumes that there is a direct link between an executive’s 
actions and firm performance.  It does not specify (1) how firm performance should be measured 
(e.g. profit growth, total shareholder return, etc.); (2) whether firm performance should be 
measured in absolute or relative terms; (3) the time period over which firm performance should 
be measured; (4) how an executive’s contribution to firm performance can be quantified; and (5) 
how to set target(s) for an executive (e.g. should targets be realistic or challenging given recent 
trends in firm performance?).   
5. Strategic pay principle: An executive’s 
remuneration should be tied to the firm’s 
strategy (i.e. long-term objectives). 
The strategic pay principle is an extension of the pay-for-performance principle, where firm 
performance is defined by its strategy.  Thus, the above comments are also applicable.  
6. Balanced measurement principle: The 
performance measures, on which an 
executive’s remuneration is contingent, 
The balanced measurement principle is an extension of the pay-for-performance principle, where 
firm performance is measured using a range of financial and non-financial metrics.  However, 
this principle does not specific how performance measures are to be selected and whether or not 
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should include a range of financial and 
non-financial metrics. 
there should be an equal number of financial and non-financial metrics. 
7. Out-performance principle: An 
executive’s bonus should be contingent 
on targets that represent a significant 
improvement in firm performance, 
beyond the status quo. 
The out-performance principle is an extension of the pay-for-performance principle, focusing on 
target setting.  By making bonuses contingent on challenging (or stretching) targets, an executive 
may be encouraged to take more risk than is desirable. 
8. Alignment principle: Variable 
remuneration, particularly equity-based 
schemes, should be used to align the 
interests of executives with those of 
shareholders. 
The alignment principle is an extension of the pay-for-performance principle, where firm 
performance is defined in terms of shareholders’ interests.  It assumes that shareholders’ interests 
are paramount, homogeneous and measurable (e.g. relative total shareholder return).  It also 
assumes that executives will not act in the best interests of shareholders in the absence of 
variable remuneration. 
9. Motivation principle: Variable 
remuneration should be used to motivate 
an executive to maximise his/her effort. 
The motivation principle is the assumption underlying the pay-for-performance principle.  
Executives are assumed to be primarily motivated by monetary rewards, rather than other 
extrinsic and intrinsic rewards.  It is also assumed that the effort of executives will be lower or 
misdirected in the absence of variable remuneration. 
10. Ability-to-pay principle: The board (or 
remuneration committee) should take the 
firm’s financial position into account 
when deciding on an executive’s potential 
and actual remuneration. 
The ability-to-pay principle states that the board (or remuneration committees) has a 
responsibility to ensure that executive remuneration, both potential and actual, is not excessive or 
beyond the means of the firm.  However, how the affordability of executive remuneration is to be 
determined is unspecified.  This principle does not account for the impact of actual executive 
remuneration on shareholders’ wealth (e.g. executive stock options dilute the share price).  
11. Conformance principle: The board (or 
remuneration committee) should take best 
practice, regulations and the legitimate 
interests of stakeholders into account 
when deciding on executive 
remuneration. 
The conformance principle states that the board (or remuneration committee) should take societal 
expectations and norms into account when making decisions, although the board will have to 
define societal expectations and norms.  The meaning of ‘best practice’ and ‘the legitimate 
interests of stakeholders’ are open to interpretation; non-shareholding stakeholders may still be 
treated as a means to the end of shareholder value.  Also, the meaning of ‘take into account’ is 
open to interpretation, placing no explicit obligation on the board. 
12. Independence principle: An executive 
should not be involved in the setting of 
his/her own remuneration.  Therefore, the 
remuneration committee should be 
comprised of a majority of independent 
The independence principle assumes that (1) executives would act in an opportunistic manner if 
they are able to set their own remuneration, and (2) independent non-executive directors are able 
to make better decisions about executive remuneration than any other group.  However, 
independence is not defined and usually does not exclude social ties between executives and 
non-executive directors.  Further, experience in human resources management is not an explicit 
Executive Remuneration Principles, Practices and Processes 
Page 33 
non-executive directors. prerequisite for being a member of the remuneration committee. 
13. Consultant principle: The board (or 
remuneration committee) should seek 
advice from specialist, independent 
remuneration consultants when making 
decisions on executive remuneration. 
The consultant principle is related to the market and independence principles.  This principle (1) 
assumes that consultants do not have vested interests in the data and advice they provide to the 
board, (2) does not restrict the methods for collecting and analysing data which consultants may 
use (e.g. direct comparison, scaled comparison, job-sizing, etc.), and (3) does not specify how 
the board should select consultants. 
14. Transparency principle: The board (or 
remuneration committee) should disclose 
the firm’s remuneration policies and 
practices. 
The transparency principle assumes that shareholders and the public have a right to know the 
firm’s remuneration policies and practices.  The board still has discretion in deciding how much 
detail about executive remuneration to disclose (e.g. specific performance measures may not be 
disclosed, so that competitors do not know the firm’s strategic priorities). 
 
 




(out of 45) 
Disagreement 
(out of 45) 




Bender and Moir (2006, p.80): A committee 
chair commented, “When we look at salaries 
we look at base pay, and we’re very careful 
to construct something that looks exactly 
competitive with our competitors... once we 
do incentives we also do look at what the 
market is paying for equivalent jobs... 
Because as I said before, our executives… 
always have the opportunity of taking 
something else, given their skills. And 
certainly, comparability of the package is an 
important factor in that.” 
Perkins and Hendry (2005, p.1453): “One 
Remco director categorically denied the 
existence of a recognizable market for 
executives, ‘certainly not like that for beef or 
shares’. Instead there are ‘just key people in 
unique positions at a given moment in time, 





Bender (2011b, p.18): A company 
chairperson explained, “We clearly in this 
particular case went beyond what we had 
established as at that level of the 
organisation. But given the strategic 
importance of the project he was going to 
lead, the value that he brought to the 
company over and above what the job 
specified, we said well there is clearly a 
premium in there and we want the man, so 
what is he worth?” 
Morris and Fenton-O’Creevy (1996, p.712): 
In the case company, 28% of participants 
disagreed and 18% of participants were 
neutral to the following statement, “The 
compensation package… provides an 





Malsch et al. (2012, p.410): A member of the 
compensation committee argued, “I think fair 
has to do with treating the whole 
organization as decently as you can in terms 
of fair income… I hate it when I see a CEO 
earning much more than his direct reports. I 
Bender and Moir (2006, p.82): A committee 
chair commented, “Oh, I don’t think we’ve 
got those sort of formula [relating executive 
pay to average or minimum wages] in place. 
Because I think the top end is driven by 
assessment of what the market would pay for 
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think the relativity as you go down the 
structure should have a certain kind of 
consistency…” 
that post… The bottom end is related to the 
annual pay round, and that’s mainly inflation 





O’Neill (2007, p.698): A remuneration 
committee chair explained, “…making sure 
that the pay of the CEO balances two things. 
One, being defensible in terms of being able 
to explain it to the various stakeholders… 
The second major… that the link between 
what somebody is paid and the performance 
of the company is at least explainable.” 
Bender (2004, p.530): A human resources 
director commented, “The first thing to say is 
that performance-related pay is the Holy 
Grail of companies. I mean, if somebody had 
actually got there, really achieved it, then 
we’d all be following like mad – but nobody 
has.” 
5. Strategic pay 
principle 
13 2 
Hermanson et al. (2012, p.698): A 
remuneration committee chair commented, 
“We look carefully at the objectives at the 
compensation committee and board level. 
People do what you pay them to do. The 
compensation system needs to tie to the 
company’s plan and strategy.” 
Pennings (1993, p.277): “Executives express 
stronger beliefs in the feasibility of tying pay 
to strategic performance, although such 
opinions are occasionally tempered… Many 
Dutch executives express doubt about pay as 






Bender and Moir (2006, pp.84-85): “In order 
for performance-related pay to be beneficial 
to the company, the performance… measures 
must be suitable for the business, and the 
targets must be appropriate to the corporate 
goals… The interviewees were aware of 
these issues, and many commented on the 
need… to balance financial and non-financial 
measures.” 
Hodak (2005, p.118): One executive 
commented, “Our system was designed to get 
rid of short-term behavior. As far as I can 
tell, it’s just channeled that behavior in 





Ogden and Watson (2004, p.47): “The 
performance metrics for the short-term 
annual bonus were usually couched in terms 
of financial and non-financial performance 
measures and personal objectives, while 
Main et al. (2011, pp.23-24): A director 
reflected on what drives the design of 
incentive schemes, “We have created 
conformity driven by the corporate 
governance guidelines. When we want to 
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those for the LTIPs were specified 
exclusively in terms of financial 
performance, usually measured in terms of 
total shareholder return. All the interviewees 
were confident that the targets set for 
performance were challenging and stretched 
the executive directors.” 
create something new, for example, profit 
share or private equity style plans, it can 
make it very difficult. Executives are cynical 
about performance conditions but investors 
want stretching targets – this means that we 
have conformed to a certain type, and the 
question is do they really incentivise and 





Hermanson et al. (2012, p.688): A 
remuneration committee chair argued, “We 
need to incent the correct behaviors and can’t 
pay too much attention to activists or 
politicians. You should pay attention to the 
buy-side guys (not the sell-side). They want 
executives to be highly motivated and 
aligned with the shareholders.” 
Hodak (2005, pp.118-199): “Most senior 
executives, right up to the CEO, will tell you 
that movements in their stock price over 
periods as long as five years usually have 
more to do with exogenous factors than the 




Bender (2004, p.525): “And one [CEO] 
participant summed up both sides of the 
argument: And obviously there is always a 
moment in time where probably you put in 
that little extra effort because you might get 
additional reward. But I very seldom see 
people, say, work longer hours or work 
differently or become suddenly more 
intelligent because they are performance-
related.” 
Pepper et al. (2013, p.41): “…the prevailing 
view was that most executives are driven by 
a sense of achievement, of being part of a 
successful management team, of working in a 
place where they are in tune with the 
organisation’s values and objectives, and of 





Chapman and Kelliher (2011, p.131): “The 
significance of the effective management of 
reward mix for cost management purposes 
was raised by all interviewees… [This is 
illustrated by one consultant’s comment on a 
--- 
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company’s approach:] ...by appearing to 
create a positive image or working 
environment, then they can afford not to have 




Bender and Moir (2006, p.79): A CEO 
commented, “You have in a remuneration 
structure to try and ensure that you’ve got 
fairness. That’s fairness to the individual and 
fairness to the organisation. And the 
organisation means all the constituent parts: 
the customers, the other members of staff, 
and the shareholders.” 
Main et al. (2011, p.23): A director 
exclaimed: “Remuneration in UK feels 
straight-jacketed. The tick box culture in the 
UK means you do what other people do, but 
it doesn’t make sense for us. At {previous 
company}, it was a multi-national company, 
creating pay from scratch so it was 




Main et al. (2011, p.21): A director 
commented, “We are quite sensitive to 
getting it right and being seen to be getting it 
right. The non-executive directors do this for 
a living, so one mistake can be detrimental as 
your reputation is your livelihood.” 
Bender (2011b, p.12): A remuneration 
committee chair commented, “Well, he [the 
CEO] has considerable influence in the 
proposals, because he says firmly what he 
thinks he needs … for his executives, in 
order to retain the team that he’s put in place. 
And that is something that we would take 
very seriously, obviously. … - it is very 
difficult for a group of non-execs to go 
contrary to [his] wishes to retain the team 
that he’s selected, and he thinks is vital to the 




Bender and Moir (2006, p.80): A committee 
chair explained, “The reason we went from 
40% to 60% [bonus cap] was because we 
were advised by [consultancy] that was what 
the typical market company was doing. And 
therefore we just thought that we were falling 
in line with market practice. And I think that 
was true.” 
Conyon et al. (2000, p.488): “Similarly, 
another director suggested that external 
consultation is susceptible to becoming a 
“self-fulfilling prophecy”. [Consultants] keep 
promoting what they think is the industry 
norm, and we ask, “Is it the industry norm 
that you have suggested?” And then they 
promote to another company and then to a 
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third company… so it’s become an industry 




Clarke et al. (1998, p.25): “Asked if 
information disclosure had led to a 
ratcheting-up effect on pay, one director 
indicated: “Not so far, but it could have such 
an effect. Equally, public/shareholder 
disquiet at some levels of pay may cause 
companies to think more carefully about how 
they justify very high levels of pay to 
directors”.” 
Perkins and Hendry (2005, p.1462): “On the 
positive side, Remco members interpret it as 
a possible force for the exercise of more 
informed judgement… On the other hand, 
this visibility may encourage continual 
argument around comparisons… Since 
everyone tends to think they are better than 
the average, equity will be sought with the 
higher performers, risking the ‘suck up’ 
effect noted.” 
 
Table 3: Remuneration Principles and Practices 
Remuneration Practices Remuneration Principles Selected Findings from Prior Studies 
Base salary and benefits 
- Level: Set relative to a 
peer group (e.g. 
median or upper 
quartile) 
- Peer group: Selected 
competitors, industry 
or stock exchange 
index  
- Remuneration committees typically set executives’ 
base salary and benefits at the median to upper 
quartile relative to a peer group, and this is justified 
using the market, human resources and consultant 
principles (e.g. Bender, 2007; Clarke et al., 1998; 
Ogden and Watson, 2012).   
- The fairness, pay-for-performance and conformance 
principles may act as constraints on increases in base 
salary and benefits (Morris and Fenton-O’Creevy, 
1996). 
- Ogden and Watson (2012, p.513): “For example, a 
member of Alpha’s Remco commented: …there is a 
huge amount of comparison… But you still have to 
decide what salary you pay somebody – has the 
bloke really performed in the year? ...Whatever the 
benchmarks say, you’ve still got to say: what is his 
contribution?”  
Pension or superannuation 
- Type of scheme: 
Defined benefit (e.g. 
percentage of salary 
upon retirement) or 
defined contribution 
- There is scant qualitative research on pensions, aside 
from odd comment that remuneration committees 
take advice on the tax implications of schemes 
(Chapman and Kelliher, 2011) and disclosure of 
schemes has become best practice (Kovacevic, 
2009). 
- It is likely that pension schemes will be justified 
using the market, human resources, ability-to-pay, 
conformance and consultant principles. 
- Chapman and Kelliher (2011, p.127): A consultant 
explained, “I have had conversations with FDs 
[finance directors] who have dismissed the need to 
do anything about DC [defined contribution] 
engagement because they just don’t see the point – 
its increased costs for the company…” 
Other: Recruitment, 
retention and severance  
- Type: Cash and/shares 
- Conditional: Length of 
service and/or 
performance 
- There is scant qualitative research on recruitment, 
retention and severance payments. 
- The human resources principle provides justification 
for recruitment and retention payments (Ogden and 
Watson, 2012). 
- The market and pay-for-performance principles 
provide justification for severance payments 
(Hermanson et al., 2012; Reilly and Scott, 2005). 
- Hermanson et al. (2012, p.678): “As described by 
one interviewee below, key areas of focus were the 
executive’s contribution to the company and input 
from the consultant on market data: …When the 
CEO retired in 2008… The board wanted to have the 
retirement agreement reflect a very positive 
contribution to the company… No formula to 
follow.” 
Short-term incentives  
- Level: Multiple of 
salary 
- Qualitative research on executive remuneration has 
tended to discuss variable remuneration in general 
terms or with respect to long-term incentives, rather 
- Penning (1993, p.272): “…bonuses …presume 
flexibility in tying pay to performance. Since variable 
pav makes for a more immediate connection, 
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- Target: Absolute 
and/or relative 
- Type: Cash and/or 
shares 
- Timing: Immediate 
and/or deferred 
than short-term incentives.   
- The market, human resources, pay-for-performance, 
strategic pay, balanced measurement, alignment, 
motivation and conformance principles provide a 
framework for short-term incentive schemes (e.g. 
Bender, 2004, 2007; Hermanson et al., 2012; Main et 
al., 2008). 
- Applying the principles may result in conflicts that 
the remuneration committee has to manage.  The 
market and human resources principles put upward 
pressure on the level of pay, while the pay-for-
performance (e.g. during a recession) and fairness 
principles may put downward pressure on the level 
of pay (Hermanson et al., 2012). 
individuals attribute a greater motivational effect to 
it, at least among US executives in several 
industries.” 
- Bender and Moir (2006, p.82): “The short-term 
element, normally an annual bonus scheme, will 
often include both corporate and individual 
performance targets.” 
- Pepper et al. (2013, pp.41-42): “Short-term 
incentives (annual bonuses) were generally regarded 
as very effective by executives and non-executives 
alike. Participants described them, in comparison 
with long-term incentives, as having much better 
‘line of sight’, meaning that the connection between 
successful actions and reward was more obvious.” 
Long-term incentives 
- Level: Multiple of 
salary 




- Target: Absolute and/ 
or relative 
- Testing: When 
awarded and/or at 
vesting 
- Type: Cash, options 
and/or shares 
- Length of vesting 
period (e.g. 3-10 
years) 
- Qualitative research has found that remuneration 
committees use a range of remuneration principles to 
justify long-term incentive schemes (e.g. Bender, 
2004; Hermanson et al., 2012; Ogden and Watson, 
2008; Pepper et al., 2013).   
- For example, St-Onge et al. (2001) found that 
executives provided five different justifications for 
having stock option plans.  These justifications were 
consistent with the alignment, conformance, human 
resources, motivation and pay-for-performance 
principles. 
- However, there are conflicts between the principles 
(as described under short-term incentives).  Using 
long-term incentives as means of attracting and 
retaining talent is consistent with the human resource 
principles, but may conflict with the alignment and 
pay-for-performance principles.  
- Main et al. (2008, p.230): A remuneration committee 
chair explained, “The obvious metrics of EPS and 
TSR are catch-alls but it’s where you always end 
up”. 
- Pepper et al. (2013, p.42): “Long-term incentive 
plans, on the other hand, were generally seen as at 
best only partially effective; indeed, many of the 
executives in our study felt that LTIPs failed to meet 
their main objectives. Various reasons were given 
for this. Commonly cited was the complexity of most 
LTIPs… A specific problem that participants 
identified with LTIPs was the use of comparative 
performance measures, such as relative total 
shareholder return (TSR). As one CEO said, “I don’t 
know how to manage relative TSR . . . you don’t 
wake up in the morning trying to manage something 
relative”.” 
Minimum shareholding - There is scant qualitative research on a minimum - Bender (2007) studied 41 changes in remuneration 
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requirement 
- Level: Multiple of 
salary 
shareholding requirement for executives (cf. Bender, 
2007). 
- It is likely that a minimum shareholding requirement 
will be justified using the alignment and 
conformance principles.  It may also be justified 
using the human resources principle (Bender, 2007).   
practices in 12 UK companies. One of these changes 
involved the introduction of a minimum 
shareholding requirement in order to financially tie 
executives to the company and lessen the chance of 
them leaving the company.  
Mix of fixed and variable  
- From mainly fixed to 
mainly variable 
- The mix of fixed and variable remuneration has not 
been specifically studied by qualitative researchers.   
- However, the diffusion of the alignment, motivation 
and pay-performance principles are likely to have 
been influential in the shift from mainly fixed to 
mainly variable remuneration (e.g. compare 
Pennings, 1993 and Bender, 2007).  
- Conyon et al. (2000, p.489): “One director claimed 
good practice in long-term compensation as being: a 
salary much lower in proportion to the whole, a 
benefit package substantially less attractive than 
what is available here, but with enormous so-called 
incentive elements…” 
Level of fixed, variable 
and total 
- Level: Set relative to a 
peer group (e.g. 
median or upper 
quartile) 
- Peer group: Selected 
competitors, industry 
or stock exchange 
index 
- While the alignment, motivation, pay-for-
performance principles influence how executives are 
paid, the human resources and market principles 
influence how much they are paid (e.g. Main, 1993; 
Ogden and Watson, 2004, 2012; Perkins and 
Hendry, 2005).  The combination of the human 
resources and market principles may result in ever-
increasing levels of pay as remuneration committees 
believe their executives possess above-average 
capabilities, deserving of above-average pay. 
- Surprisingly, the ability-to-pay principle is rarely 
mentioned in qualitative research. 
- Ogden and Watson (2012, p.515): “As one 
interviewee put it: ‘If the total package isn’t good 
enough, they [the executives] will just move 




Figure 1: Remuneration Decision-Making and Influential Parties  











































Appendix A: Prevalence of Remuneration Principles in Qualitative Research 
 
This appendix presents a brief summary of qualitative research on executive remuneration including studies that surveyed and interviewed 
executives, non-executive directors and others (e.g. remuneration consultants) as well as studies that analysed remuneration disclosures in 
corporate annual reports.  Table 4 presents a summary of the research methods, findings and prevalence of remuneration principles from 45 
studies.  The focus of prior research has not been to identify remuneration principles or to find evidence that supports or reputes remuneration 
principles.  This meant that there was a high degree of subjectivity in quantifying the prevalence of the remuneration principles.  The studies 
reviewed were read at least twice by this researcher and keyword searchers were also used to identify the presence or absence of the 
remuneration principles.  Note that the presence or absence of the remuneration principles relates to the participants’ beliefs about executive 
remuneration, not the authors’ beliefs.  No judgement was made regarding the strength of agreement or disagreement with the remuneration 
principles in the studies reviewed.  Therefore, the ticks () and crosses () presented Table 4 should be interpreted with caution.   
 
Notes to Table 4: 
 – A tick indicates that the participants in the study supported or agreed with a particular remuneration principle. 
– A cross indicates that the participants in the study criticised or disagreed with a particular remuneration principle. 
 
1. Market principle 
2. Human resources principle 
3. Fairness principle 
4. Pay-for-performance principle 
5. Strategic pay principle 
6. Balanced performance measurement principle 
7. Out-performance principle 
8. Alignment principle 
9. Motivation principle 
10. Ability-to-pay principle 
11. Conformance principle 
12. Independence principle 
13. Consultant principle 
14. Transparency principle 
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a. Tosi and Gomez-Mejia’s (1989; 1994) composite variable, “monitoring”, is based on 17 items in a questionnaire.  These items relate to 7 
remuneration principles.  However, they did not report descriptive statistics for each of the 17 items, only the monitoring variable.  From the 
statistics reported, it is evidence that there is strong support for the 17 items (with high factor loadings).  It is likely that the respondents 
expressed a range of opinions about the 17 items (as represented on a 1-5 Likert scale).  Nevertheless, no crosses are indicated in the table 
due to the lack of information. 
b. Morris and Fenton-O’Creevy (1996) did not report descriptive statistics for items in a questionnaire relating to the market, fairness and pay-
for-performance principles.  While it is likely that some respondents disagreed with the items, no crosses are indicated in the table for these 
principles due to a lack of information. 
c. Bart et al. (2011) did not report in-depth descriptive statistics for the items in a questionnaire relating to the market, pay-for-performance, 
independence, consultant and transparency principles.  While it is likely that some respondents disagreed with the items, no crosses are 
indicated in the table for these principles due to a lack of information. 
d. Wilkins et al.’s (2015) definition of fairness differs from that put forward in this paper.  They defined fairness in terms of process and 
outcome for the CEO and shareholders, rather than the relationship between CEO and employee pay. 
 
Table 4: Summary of Qualitative Research on Executive Remuneration 
Study Method Remuneration Principles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Number of ticks () 25 18 6 34 13 9 6 14 24 3 20 11 25 7 
Number of crosses () 6 1 3 4 2 1 2 2 8 0 5 1 7 5 
Summary of Relevant Findings               
Tosi and Gomez-
Mejia (1989)a 
Survey of 175 Chief 
Compensation Officers 
from US manufacturing 
companies. 
Owner-controlled firms put greater emphasis on a 
variable pay philosophy than management-
controlled firms. 
              
Zajac (1990) Survey of 118 CEOs 
from large US 
companies. 
CEOs satisfied with their pay, perceived a link 
between their wealth and firm wealth, and their 
reputation and firm wealth. 
              
Main (1993) Interviews with 24 
directors and executives 
from large UK 
companies. 
Focused on remuneration practices and processes, 
rather than remuneration principles.  




Pennings (1993) Interviews (1985-1988) 
with 51 US executives, 5 
French executives and 
11 Dutch executives 
from large companies. 
There was a range of opinions: Some believed that 
executives can influence firm performance and 
monetary incentives can motivate executives, while 
others did not; country and industry influenced 
executives’ beliefs. 





   
 
 
     
Tosi and Gomez- Survey of 243 Chief Owner-controlled firms put greater emphasis on a               
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Mejia (1994)a Compensation Officers 
from US manufacturing 
companies. 




Justifications of new 
LTIPs in the proxy 
statements of 352 large 
US companies between 
1976 and 1990. 
Compensation committees publicly justified 
adoption of LTIPs using alignment principle (47%) 
and human resources principle (51%), with the 
former (latter) becoming more (less) frequent over 
time. 19% had both principles. 




Survey (50) of and 
interviews (12) with 
executives at a large UK 
financial services firm. 
There were a range of opinions: Some executives 
believed that monetary incentives motivated them, 
while others did not; most executives believed 













     
Wade et al. 
(1997) 
Justifications of CEO 
pay in the 1992 proxy 
statements of 266 large 
US companies. 
Compensation committees publicly justified CEO 
pay using the consultant and alignment principles 
and appeals to firm (accounting and market) 
performance. 
              
Clarke et al. 
(1998) 
Survey of 342 chairs of 
boards and remuneration 
committees from large 
UK companies. 
Studied chairs’ opinions of the UK’s Hampel 1998 
Report; opinions varied, but most chairs believed 
that accountability has been overemphasised in the 
public debate. 





Justification of new 
LTIPs in the proxy 
statements of 408 large 
US companies between 
1982 and 1992. 
49% of compensation committees publicly justified 
adoption of LTIPs using the alignment principle. 
              
Conyon et al. 
(2000) 
Interviews with 6 non-
executives directors and 
2 executives from 8 large 
UK companies. 
As the interviews were not the main focus of this 
study, few inferences can be made. The 
internationalisation of the executive labour market 
was noted as influential.  




St-Onge et al. 
(2001) 
Interviews with 18 
executives from large 
Canadian companies. 
Executives’ opinions of stock option plans were 
consistent with many remuneration principles.  
They also perceived stock option plans as necessary 
because the plans were widely adopted by other 
firms. 
        
 
 
     
Beer and Katz 
(2003) 
Survey (in 1997) of 205 
executives from a wide 
range of countries.  
Executives perceived bonus plans as necessary to 
attract, motivate and retain staff and enhance firm 
performance, although authors argue this is empty 
rhetoric as remuneration practices were not related 
              
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to firm performance. 
Bender (2003) Interviews with 11 
people from 2 UK 
utilities including non-
executives directors, 
executives and external 
consultants. 
Interviewees’ opinions were consistent with many 
of the remuneration principles; they had an 
optimistic view of executives, with a strong 
emphasis on using remuneration to attract and retain 
executives. 
              
Bender (2004) Interviews with 30 
directors and executives 
from 5 large UK 
companies as well as 5 
of their consultants. 
Interviewees’ opinions were consistent with most of 
the remuneration principles; they had an optimistic 
view of executives, where incentives provided 
strategic focus; there were mixed views on the 
motivation principle. 
   
 
 
    
 
 
     
Franco-Santos et 
al. (2004) 
Survey of 117 executives 
from large UK 
companies. 
Executives perceived performance measurement 
systems as providing strategic focus and, to a much 
lesser extent, motivation. 
              
Ogden and 
Watson (2004) 
Interviews with an 
undisclosed number of 
directors, who serve on 
remuneration 
committees, from 4 large 
UK water utilities. 
Remuneration committees used consultants and 
reviewed market comparisons, but the interviewees 
felt they could resist market pressure to increase 
pay; while the CEO was involved in determining 
his/her pay, performance measures and targets, this 
was not perceived to be an undue influence. 
 
 




Spira and Bender 
(2004) 
Same data source as 
Bender (2004) plus 
interviews with audit 
committee members. 
Remuneration committees and their consultants 
have to work independently of management. 
              
Hodak (2005) Survey and interview 
data from an undisclosed 
number of executives 
and consultants. 
The author argues that simple pay-for-performance 
schemes are the most effective and that companies 
should only have one scheme.  






      
Perkins and 
Hendry (2005) 
Interviews with 7 non-
executive directors from 
large UK companies and 
5 recruitment 
consultants.  
The authors and interviewees critique the notion of 
a labour market for executives, but using 
comparative data is still the norm; money seen as a 
scorecard for executives. 
 
 
       
 
 
    
 
 
Reilly and Scott 
(2005) 
Interviews with 21 non-
executive directors from 
US companies. 
The interviewees indicated they had a close 
relationship with the CEO, despite being considered 
independent; they also indicated that they would not 
pay CEOs below the median relative to other CEOs. 
 
 
             
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Bender and Moir 
(2006) 
Interviews (2001-2003) 
with 30 directors and 
executives from 5 large 
UK companies as well as 
5 of their consultants. 
In setting executive remuneration, the interests of 
executives and shareholders were paramount, 
although the interests of customers and employees 
may also be considered.  Interviewees’ opinions 
were consistent with most remuneration principles, 
although problems with several principles were 






           
Point and Tyson 
(2006) 
Justifications of CEO 
pay in the 2002 annual 
reports of 23 large 
European and UK 
companies. 
The sampled companies’ remuneration policies 
were consistent with many of the remuneration 
principles; the authors argued that the companies 
had adopted the language of corporate governance 
codes. 
              
Bender (2007) Interviews (2001-
2003)with 30 directors 
and executives from 5 
large UK companies as 
well as 5 of their 
consultants. 
Changes in executive remuneration practices were 
made because current levels of pay were below the 
market norms and practices were inconsistent with 
strategy and best practice. 
              
Lawler and 
Finegold (2007) 
Survey of 768 CEOs and 
non-executive directors 
of large US companies. 
Historical increases in CEO pay were perceived to 
have resulted from the use of consultants, weak 
boards, and adoption of new equity-based 
incentives; However, respondents perceived CEO 
pay to be tied to firm performance. 
   
 
 







O’Neill (2007) Interviews with an 
undisclosed number of 
non-executives directors 
from large Australian 
companies. 
The interviewees expressed concern about the level 
of CEO pay; directors’ perceptions of stakeholders’ 
views on CEO pay act as a constraint.               
Main et al. (2008) Interviews (2006) with 
22 directors, who serve 
on remuneration 
committees, of large UK 
companies. 
The directors believed that executives are motivated 
by a range of factors; that shareholders (and their 
representatives, e.g. ABI) act as a constraint on pay; 
and that selecting EPS and TSR as performance 
measures was an act of conformance. 
        
 
 




with 13 non-executive 
directors, 4 CEOs, 7 
senior managers (who 
support the remuneration 
committee) and 2 
In designing LTIPs, remuneration committees were 
concerned about the legitimacy of their plans in the 
eyes of shareholders and the extent to which the 
plans motivated executives. 
              





Interviews with 50 
recruitment consultants 
from Europe. 
Consultants are the key intermediary in the 
executive labour market.               
Kovacevic (2009) Interviews with 14 non-
executive directors, 6 
executives and 2 
consultants. 
Some interviewees believed that disclosure 
regulation has resulted in increasing levels of 
executive remuneration; not all interviewees agreed, 
viewing transparency as necessary. 
             
 
 
Bart et al. (2011)c Survey of 47 non-
executive directors of 
Canadian public service 
organisations. 
Directors asked to rate the importance of 24 
questions related to CEO pay; market 
considerations, performance measurement, 
independent and transparency were rated as 
important (>5 on a 1-7 scale). 
              
Bender (2011a) Interviews (2001-2003) 
with 30 directors and 
executives from 5 large 
UK companies as well as 
5 of their consultants. 
Remuneration consultants provide data about the 
market, enhance the independence of the 
remuneration committee, advice on best practice, 
liaise with institutional investors, and enhance 
organisational legitimacy. 




Bender (2011b) Interviews (2001-2003) 
with 30 directors and 
executives from 5 large 
UK companies as well as 
5 of their consultants. 
The author highlights the difficulties remuneration 
committees face in trying to meet the expectations 
set out in corporate governance codes and that the 
executive labour market is a fiction. 
              
Chapman and 
Kelliher (2011) 
Interviews with 10 
consultants. 
Studied consultants’ opinions on the determinants 
of reward mix in firms at all levels; market trends 
were most influential. 
              
Main et al. (2011) Interviews with 15 chairs 
of remuneration 
committees from large 
UK companies. 
Remuneration committees negotiate with 
executives, shareholders and others, but tend to 
settle on the market and regulatory norms; 
Executives use pay as a scorecard. 
      
 
 
   
 
 




Interviews with an 
undisclosed number of 
risk and human resource 
managers from 4 Italian 
companies. 
Studied the extent to which performance measures – 
on which incentives were dependent – were 
explicitly linked to risk management; interviewees 
believed that there should be a link. 
              
Hermanson et al. 
(2012) 
Interviews with 20 non-
executive directors from 
large US companies. 
Interviewees emphasised tension between 
attracting, motivating and retaining executives and 
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and the public. 
Kostiander and 
Ikäheimo (2012) 
Interviews with 21 CEOs 
and 20 Chairs of 23 large 
Finnish state-owned 
companies (11 are listed) 
and 4 consultants. 
Interviewees were primarily concerned with being 
able to pay enough to attract and retain talented 
executives; the authors concluded that consultants 
were not independent and CEOs had too much 
influential over their pay. 







Malsch et al. 
(2012) 
Interviews with 19 
members of 
remuneration 
committees from large 
Canadian companies and 
6 others. 
Interviewees’ views were consistent with 
individualism and hierarchy cultures and, to a lesser 
extent, an egalitarianism culture; Remuneration 
committees are mainly concerned with attracting 









with 13 non-executive 
directors, 4 CEOs, 7 
senior managers and 2 
consultants. 
Remuneration committees are primarily concerned 
with not underpaying executives and losing talented 
executives, although they are careful to avoid 
criticism from shareholders; they also sought input 
from CEOs on their own pay, although this was not 
perceived to be an undue influence. 
 
 
             
Johl et al. (2013) Survey of 42 large UK 
companies; Interviews 
with an undisclosed 
number of people from 6 
large UK companies. 
Survey results and interviewees’ opinions supported 
the notion that adopting executive stock options will 
not decrease entrepreneurial activity and may 
motivate executives to have a long-term focus. 
              
Pepper et al. 
(2013) 
Interviews with 15 
executives and non-
executive directors and 
survey of 75 executives 
from large UK 
companies. 
Executives discount long-term incentives to a 
greater extent than was rational and were primarily 
concerned with social comparison (market 
principle); there was a trade-off between intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation. 
        
 
 
     
Adamson et al. 
(2014) 
Interviews with 19 
consultants from the UK. 
Studied the professionalisation of the executive 
remuneration consultancy. 
          
 
 
   
Pepper and Gore 
(2014) 
Survey of 756 executives 
from large companies 
around the world. 
Executives have varying preferences towards risk, 
uncertainty, the future and long-term incentives; 
Executives undervalue long-term incentives, 
undermining the effectiveness of such schemes for 
shareholders. 
   
 
 
    
 
 
     
Wilkins et al. 
(2015)d 
Experiment with 89 
usable responses from 
compensation committee 
Experiment involved the decision to revise 
downwards executives’ performance targets.  
Generally, directors did not want to revise the 
              
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members in US public 
companies.  
targets because the events described in the scenario 
were not considered extraordinary.  Directors were 
concerned with fairness for both the CEO and 
shareholders in making the decision. 
 
